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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
PEARL SPENCER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 6654
SANTA FE T:RAIL TRANSPORTATION
Co., a Corporation, and LEONARD

RusHING,

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

We have read appellant's brief with astonishment.
The facts have been so carelessly handled, that a complete picture cannot be acquired. We shall, therefore,
make our own statement.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is the first of a series of lawsuits growing out
of the same accident. In the second case, Maxine Anderson, the driver of the car in which the present plaintiff
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was riding, is the plaintiff and these same defendants
are the defendants. That case has already been tried
before the same judge who tried the instant case, with
the same attorneys, a verdict rendered against these defendants, and the appeal therein will undoubtedly be
docketed in this court before this case is heard. A third
case was 'brought by Rose Sorensen (variously denominated Mary Rosetta and Mary Rose Sorensen, hut hereinafter called Rose Sorensen) the leading lady of the
entire production, in the District Court of Sanpete County, from which court it was transferred to the United
States District Court for Utah and is there now pending
with the assurance of counsel in those cases (Mr. Benjamin ~Spence), that all additional cases, two or three
in number, will .be filed in that court, so that the remaining trials, if any, may be consolidated. However, at the
time the instant action was tried, none of the other parties
had brought suit in any court, all stating they were
awaiting the test run of this case before taking action.
We feel that it will be very enlightening to this court
and aid it materially in its consideration of this case to
have before it the Anderson case, and for a proper solution of the Anderson case this ·court may desire to have
before it and in mind many particulars, if not the entire
record, in the instant ·ca.se.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of November 15, 1942, a Chevrolet
automobile driven by one Rose Sorensen and contain-
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ing as additional passengers Emma Jensen, Ina Sorensen, and Cleone Jensen, was proceeding south on U. S.
Highway 89 between Gunnison and Redrnond, Utah.
Rose Sorensen and the other occupants of the Sorensen
car were all employees of the Turkey Plant at or near
Gunnison, U tab, and residents of Redmond, U tab, and
had been riding back and forth to work together for
several ·weeks in the Rose Sorensen car. These four
ladies were not only lifelong friends and fellow employees and passengers, hut Ina Sorensen is Rose's
sister-in-law, Emma Jensen is Rose's sister (R. 170, 193).
None of them had ever seen or heard of the plaintiff in
this case or the driver of the car in which the plaintiff
was riding, one ~laxine Anderson, until the night of the
accident (R. 160).
The four ladies in the Chevrolet automobile testified
that as they proceeded south on U. S. Highway 89 on the
evening in question, the Santa Fe bus driven by the defendant Leonard Rushing approached from the south
going north, that approximately a mile and a half south
of the Gunnison Sugar Factory and about opposite
Avery Beck's home, the bus swerved or skidded or slipped
or glided into the Chevrolet. They all testified that the
left rear end of the bus hit the left front of the Chevrolet. Rose Sorensen testified that the bus skidded or
glided into her car. The impact, however, was bard
enough to knock her dazed (R. 112, 114, 116, 126, 127,
129). Cleone Jensen testified that the bus skidded into
the front end of the Sorensen car and knocked the left
front fender down onto the wheel so that the Chevrolet
1
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car was thrown out of control. The blow was hard
enough to make a dent in the fender and push it down
on the wheel (R. 143, 154, 155, 156, 162). Miss Jensen
also testified in answer to her counsel and on cross-examination as follows:
'' Q.

A.
By
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

* * * but you do know it was the bus that
struck you?
Yes.
MR. JONES:
That is about the only thing you're sure of,
isn't it?
Yes.
You know if the 1bus didn't hit you that there
is no ex·cuse for Miss Sorens·en running into
Miss Spencer, don't you~
After the bus hit her?
You know if the hus didn't hit you, there is
no excuse for Miss Sorensen running into the
Anderson car~
Yes.'' (R. 168, 169).

Along this same line Mis.s Sorensen testified that it
was solely due to the collision ·between her car and the
Anderson car that the plaintiff was injured and that
she, Miss .Sorens·en, told the plaintiff and Miss Anderson
that the bus had hit the .Sorensen car and that the only
way Miss Spencer and Miss Anderson knew anything
about the bus was from what she (Miss Sorensen) told
them. She also testified that she had not ·sued the defendant company and that whether or not .she did depended on how this present case came out (R. 134-136).
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Ina Sorensen testified that the bus switched
or swerved into them, and hit them in the
front side and knocked her unconscious, so that
didn't k11ow anything· for eig·ht or nine hours (R.
177, 178, 186).
them~

into
left
she
176,

Emina Jensen testified that she is positive that the
rear end of the bus hit the front part of the Sorensen
car around the front fender hard enough to knock them
dazed (R. 199, 200, 201, 209, 210).
Cleone Jensen was the only occupant of the car who
was not knocked dazed (R. 143, 156).
The testilnony of three of the ladies is to the effect
that the in1pact with the bus was not so hard, although
it knocked three of them dazed and threw the car completely out of control. Ina Sorensen, however, testified
it was hard enough to knock her out for eight or nine
hours. Rose said that the gentle gliding of the bus
knocked her dazed until she came headon into terrific
eollis,ion with the Anderson car, which headon collision
brought her back to consciousness (R. 131). All of the
four ladies testified that they customarily passed the bus
on their way home in the evenings and that they were
always nervous in passing it and had commented, ''Well,
we are past the bus again.''
Although the witnesses were excluded from the courtroom and did not hear each other testify, the occupants
of the Chevrolet car testified with significant unanimity
that the left wheels of the bus were two feet over or to
the left of the yellow line marking the center of the high-
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way and that as a result, their car went over on to the
shoulder of the highway so that their right wheels were
two feet off the highway. This unanimity of mathematical accuracy in designating the various distances
as two feet, and in other significant testimony, might
indicate preliminary rehearsals and was commented on
by us to the jury. This court may find it interesting
when it reaches a perusal of the Anderson record to
note the disa1ppearance of this unaruimity.
The ladies say that after the left rear end of the
bus hit the left front fender of their car, instead of
knocking it to the west, their car skidded or zig-sagged
to the east and almost completely across the highway,
.so that they collided headon With the Anderson car, a
Plymouth, in which the plaintiff was riding. The Anderson car was proceeding north following the bus, and
after the accident the Sorensen car was headed southeast
and the Anderson car north both on the east side of the
road. As a re·sult of the impact between the Sorensen
Chevrolet and the Anderson Plymouth, the plaintiff sustained the injuries in question. As the two cars stood
together after the impact, a milk truck coming from the
south sideswiped both of them (R. 547), sideswiping the
left side of the Plymouth and the right .side of the Chevrolet 'but not causing any of the damage to the left fender
of the .Sorensen Chevrolet car. This appears from the
entire record, and particularly the testimony of State
Highway Patrolman Embley (R. 451-454). Nor did the
collision with the Anderson car ·cause the damage to the
left front fender of the Sorensen car (R. 217, 218).
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The highway at the scene of the accident and for
several 1niles on either side is straight. The paved surface is 18 feet wide (R. 367), with a shoulder

2V2 feet

wide to the east and 1V2 feet wide to the west (R. 429).
The bus is 8 feet wide (R. 352) and the Chevrolet is 5
feet wide (R. 483). The distance from the road to the
highest point of the underside of the arc or beading of
the left front fender on the Chevrolet is 29 inches and
to the top of the fender, 5 inches higher (R. 482). The
dent in the fender supposed to have been caused by the
bus ·is above the arc or beading (Ex. 4). The distance
from the ground to the bottom of the back bumper on
the bus is 19¥2 inches and the bottom of the ibumper and
the bottom of the hody of the bus are the same distance
from the ground. The distance from the ground to the
top of the top bumper is 2714 inches. The bumpers are
flush with the body and do not project at all from the
body (R. 379, 380). From the center of the wheel housing of the rear wheels of the bus to the end of the bus
is 8 feet 7 inches and it is impossible for the bus to make
a quick slip or turn or swerve so as to throw the rear
end around, the bus being 39 feet 6 inches long and weighing between eleven and twelve tons empty (R. 352-353).
Although Miss Sorensen and Miss Anderson state
that Miss Sorensen claimed to Miss Anderson that the
bus had hit her and that that was the reason for the
collision (R.115, 229), Pearl Spencer (the plaintiff), herself, testified that that night there were a dozen different
stories of how the accident happened (R. 250).
1
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Miss Anderson and Miss Spencer both testified at
the trial that as they were proceeding north on the afternoon or evening in question, a 8anta Fe bus passed them
going north, a half a mile from the accident and about
thirty seconds ·before it happened, that they followed a
,short distance behind the bus, and that its clearance
lights were visible to them at the time the headlights
the Sorensen Chevrolet appeared and the Chevrolet came

or

across the highway and collided with them, that the bus
had passed the Sorensen car before they ever saw the
.Sorensen ·car, that they didn't see the bus hit any car
and never attributed any accident to the bus until Miss
rSorensen told them about the bus (R. 232, 234, 278), that
anything they know about the bus is what Miss Sorensen
told them. At this point it is interesting to note that
when Highway Patrolman Embly questioned Miss Anderson in the presence of Miss Spencer in Manti on the
Wednesday following the accident, Miss Anderson stated
that they hadn't seen any bus that evening, that had a
bus been ahead of them she would have noticed the numerous rear lights and been able to detect it, that he was
trying to find out if the bus was involved in the accident
and asked Miss Anderson, ''If there was something ahead
of you (referring to the ibus), Maxine, don't you think
you would have known it was the bus~" She said, "Yes,
I imagine I would." (R. 413 et s·eq., 445). The purpose
of Officer Embley's visit to Miss Anderson was to find
out if a bus was involved in the accident and she told
him she didn't see the bus at all. Mis.s 8pencer was
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present at the conversation and made no contrary declarations.
The defendant driver of the bus knew nothing of
any accident, stated that he was not involved in any accident, did not drive on the wrong side of the road, did
not skid or swerve, that it would be impossible with this
bus to n1ake it suddenly skid or swerve, and that in order
to make a turn to throw the rear end of the bus to the
west it would be necessary to head the bus so to the east
that the bus would 'be occupying the entire highway and
completely off of it to the east at least half the length
of the bus.
On the evening in question the bus reached Gunnison
about 6 :40 or 6 :45 and proceeded over the Levan cutoff
on Highway 28, then !back onto the main road into Santaquin where the driver disembarked his passengers and
baggage, loaded them onto a leased Utah Transportation
Company bus for carriage on into Salt La.ke City, and
bus 392, the bus in question with a new driver, turned
around and went back over the road it had previously
traveled. He and his passengers then proceeded on into
Salt Lake City and 392 went back to Phoenix (R. 296297). The reason f.or the change of passengers was that
one of the Santa Fe buses had broken down some time
prior to November 15 at Redmond, Utah, and that it was
necessary to lease a bus from the Utah Transportation
Company in order to maintain the 1Santa Fe schedule;
that on the 14th and 15th of November passengers had
been changed from the Santa Fe bus to the leased bus,
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on the 14th at Payson and on the 15th at Santaquin (the
leased bus on both days left Salt Lake City before the
time of the claimed collision), and the fact that this
change would ~be made had been communicated to the
passengers of bus 392 when they boar-ded the bus on the
15th and long before the time of the claimed accident
(R. 342-347, 465, 466, 500, 512, 513, 519). On the 15th of
November bus 392 stopped at Remond before the claimed
collision and discharged parts for the broken down bus
there and then proceeded on iits way (R. 348-349). This
broken down bus at Redmond was also se-en by Miss
Anderson and Miss Spencer and the passengers on the
bus.
Bus 392, the bus driven by Mr. Rushing on the 15th
of November, returned to Phoenix on the 16th, had the
regular two thousand mile service, which C?nsisted of
putting on the winter radiator cover and the brakes and
heater che-cked, left Phoenix on the 17th, and on the 18th
was proceeding over Highway 89 on the same route as
it had traversed on November 15th (testimony of Mr.
Griffith, R. 299-338). This bus was also driven by Rushing on the 18th and was stopped and examined by Highway Patrolman Embley on the Levan cutoff, Highway 28,
about four miles south of Levan. As already stated, the
driver knew nothing of any accident, there were no repairs made on the bus, and there were no marks on it
indicating that it had been in an accident such as described by the OGcupants of the Sorensen car. The material of which the bus is constructed would readily show
any collision, both 'by !indentations in the material itself
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and by loss of paint, and could not be repaired without
patching or removing of a panel and repainting, all of
which would be readily discovered upon examination
Griffith and En1bley testimony).
"\Yhen :Mr. Rushing first learned of the claimed accident a day or so later, he inunediately contacted the
ticket agents along his route to determine the names of
the passengers on his bus on the 15th of November, and
as a result of this investigation s·ecured the names of
several passengers, every one of whom that could be
discovered and subpoenaed, was subpoenaed and testified in the case. None of them knew of any accident, had
ever heard of any accident, felt any skid, swerve, jolt,
impact, or anything else to indicate anything unusual
on November 15th. All of them and the bus driver
stated that they did not drive on the wrong side of the
road, that the trip was very uneventful and peaceful,
that they were none of them acquainted with the driver
and were present at the trial solely by reason of subpoena. All of them testified that the driver drove in a
proper and careful manner, so that the trip was very
restful and uneventful.
It is interesting to note that all four occupants of
the Sorensen car and the plaintiff, Pearl Spencer, described the bus with great positiveness and particularity
and stated that it was a light color at the bottom and dark
color at the top described by some as a cream color at
the ·bottom and orange-red at the top and that they could
positively not be nustaken in this. As a matter of fact,
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~bus 392

and all the Santa Fe buses are colored in just
the opposite way, orange-red at the bottom and cream
color at the top (Griffith testimony, R. 316-317 and Exhibits 1 and 2).
It will be interesting tin exannn1ng the Anderson
record to note the squirmings and wrigglings and twistings of counsel to account for the color scheme attributed
to the· bus by the same witnesses in the Spencer case.
In an atten1pt to account for the dan1age to the left
front fender of the Chevrolet car, the defendant Rushing
recalled that he passed a truck going north immediately
after he had left Redmond and that this truck had a projecting body about the height of the damage to the fender.
Plaintiff's couns·el examined witness after witness on
behalf of the plaintiff as to the presence of any truck
and all of them denied that any truck was in the vicinity
of the accident. Then the plaintiff's counsel, toward the
end of the case, called as his witness a Mr. Whitlock
previously subpoenaed by the defendants but not used,
and this witness definitely testified that there was a truck
traveling tin a northerly direction immediately in the
vicinity of. the accident and that it almost hit his car
and was running without any signal or clearance lights.
True, Mr. Whitlock stated that the truck was ahead of
the bus instead of ·behind it, but the detailed accuracy ot
his m;emory can be ascertained by this court on an examination of the Anderson r·ecord wherein Mr. Whitlock
testified at that trial that the truck had ·clearance lights
on it.
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rrhe left front fender of the Sorensen (Chevrolet)
car was not produced or offered in evidence at the trial.
Two or three weeks before the trial, Mr. Wilkinson, one
of plaintiff's attorneys, had the fender removed from the
car at Centerfield, Utah, and took it away with him, but
it never appeared in the court room in the trial of this
case. Neither did plaintiff offer any pictures of either
the fender, the Chevrolet car, or the defendant's bus. In
fact, when defendants offered photographs of the fender
and the Chevrolet car as they appeared after the accident
(Exhibits 3 and 4), plaintiff strenuously objected to the
offer (R. 383-387) and they were received in evidence
over plaintiff's objection, although it was established
without dispute that they correctly represent the condition of the fender on November 15th after the accident
(R. 393). We commented on these matters to the jury,
apparently effectively.
We have stated the evidence somewhat in detail in
an effort to give this court some idea of the skepticism
we felt that plaintiff's evidence created at the trial of
this case and resulted in the verdict of no cause of action.
CRITICISM OF PLAI,NTIFF'S STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
Inaccuracies, contradictions and dubious insinuations are encountered through appellant's brief. We
comment on them as they appear seriatim in the brief:
On page 2 plaintiff says with reference to defendants:
"However, they do admit that the bus was in the exact
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location of the accident at the approximate time the injuries complained of occurred,'' as though there were
something sinister in the presence of the bus on the highway and some attempt of concealment on our part. There
is no question of any admission. Anyone could determine from the published schedules where on Highway 89
the Santa Fe bus would be at any approximate time.
Many other vehicles were in the exact location of the
accident at the approximate time the injuries complained
of occurred. That is no admission that they were in-.
volved in plaintiff's accident.
Plaintiff states on pa.ge 2 that the testimony of the
occupants of the Sorensen car is undenied except on one
point. This is highly inaccurate. The only material
thing that is undenied in their evidence is that they collided with the Anderson vehicle. It is emphatically
denied that tbe bus was traveling on the wrong side of
the road, that it skidded, sLid, swerved or glided suddenly or otherwise.
It is established, in the faee of plaintiff's witnesses'
denial to the contrary, that there was a truck ·so constructed as to he capable of causing the damage to the
left front fender of the Chevrolet on the highway at the
time and place in question, and the physical facts make
it extremely improbable, if not impossU.ble, for the bus
to have ·collided with the Chevrolet car as described by
the occupants of that .car. There are no marks whatever
on the bus to indicate ·such a collision, there is nothing
on the bus that could have caused the damage to the
Chevrolet fender, and it is absolutely impossible for the
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bus to make a sudden swerve or glide in one direction
so as to co1ne in contact merely with one portion of the
other car. The highest part of the bus bumper is several inches below the lowest part ·Of the crease in the
Chevrolet fender, the bumper does not ,project !beyond
the body of the bus and could not cause the crease in
any event. This crease was the main point of comment
throughout the trial. In the Anderson trial at the end
of his final argument to the jury, plaintiff'·s counsel
abandoned any claims as to this crease and declared the
point of collision was at the bottom of the front of the
fender.
It is also interesting to note that from the plaintiff's
own evidence her portion of the street is nine feet wide.
If the bus was over the center line two feet, that would
still leave seven feet of pavement. The Chevrolet is
five feet wide and it would have a space of at least two
feet to pass the bus without leaving the paven1ent.
Bla.intiff's witnesses say the Chevrolet went off the pavement two feet, which would leave a space of four feet
between the bus and the Chevrolet, according to plaintiff's own witnesses. The bus projects eight and a half
feet beyond the rear wheels. It would be utterly impossible for this huge bus to make a four-foot skid with
the rear end alone without violently affecting the
remainder of the bus. If the bus was turned suddenly
to make such a swerve, the whole front part of it would
be entirely off the pavement and into the barrow pit
on the east. Also, if this huge bus made a four-foot
flip into the plaintiff's car, plaintiff's car would not
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have been knocked to the east but would have been
knocked violently a considerable distance to the west. It
just doesn't happen that a bus of this size and weight
goes up and down the highway flipping its rear end back
and forth like a cow infe·sted with gad flies, and certainly not to the complete oblivion of all the pass·engers,
who were not only unaware of the tail flipping propensities of their ··conveyance but of the fact that it was traveling upside down with the cream colored part at the bottom and the orange-red at the top. And so for the plaintiff to say that the story of the occupants of the Sorensen ·car is undenied except in one point is to imitate the
ostrich hiding its head in the sand in the belief that
other vulnerable portions are likewise concealed.
On page 4 plaintiff states that there were three
separate collisions on the highway and ''this is also
admitted.'' How can counsel say that we admit that there
were three separate collisions when on page 2 they expressly state: ''Defendants deny that the Santa Fe bus
struck the rSorensen car.'' Counsel should be more
meticulous in examining their statements to see that
they are not inconsistent. As a matter .of fact, we do· not
believe, and neither did the jury, that our bus ever had
anything to do, either by way of collision or otherwise,
with plaintiff's accident. .So counsel is entirely in error
in stating that we admit that there were three collisions.
Also on page 4 of their brief counsel state that
Maxine Anderson's story is substantially the same as
the plaintiff's. We have already pointed out that Maxine
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Anderson testified that they were following the,bus, could
see its lights, saw its lights pass the Sorensen car, saw
no collision with the Sorensen car, and after the bus
had passed the Sorensen car that car careened across
the highway and collided with her automobile.

Officer

Embley testified that three days later Maxine Anderson,
with the plaintiff herein acquiescing by her silence, stated
she had not seen the bus and did not know what was in
front of her.
On page 6 of their brief counsel drag out of thin
air and attach to the plaintiff a lisp and state that the
record doesn't reveal her age but that she is a young
girl in her twenties. Neither of these facts is of any importance except for the purpose of showing counsel's
disregard for the record. Mr. McCullough at the trial
asked the plaintiff if the lisp that she had was caused
by the accident and on cross-examination defendants'
counsel wondered what lisp was meant and asked her
what impediment she had. The plaintiff said her words
were slurry and her s 's were terrible, but it was not apparent to anyone listening to her and we were unable
(and apparently the jury also) to detect that her words
were slurry and her s 's were terrible. .Also, on page
248 of the Record plaintiff testified that she was twentysix years old.
Again on page 7 counsel uses the verb "admitted"
in describing the presence of the bus in the vicinity of
the accident and impliedly again assert that all we con-
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tended was that we didn't run into the Sorensen car.
We have already covered these points.
Probably the most glaring misstatement is found on
page 8 and again on page 10 of appellant's brief as
follows:
''The reason for changing passengers at Santaquin and returning to Phoenix without going to
Salt Lake City was unexplained. This was especially peculiar in view of the fact that the defendant claimed that the bus had been undamaged.''
and
''Why did not the bus come to Salt Lake City?"
These two statements lead us to believe that someone
other than counsel whose names are subscdbed to appellant's brief participated in the preparation of the
brief, since certainly none of those attorneys would have
the temerity (or would they) to think they could get
away with that in this court. Page after page of the
record is devoted to that very fact. In Mr. Rushing's
testimony and also in the testimony of every one of the
passengers except Leah Cherrington the reason for the
change appears, and the fact that the change would be
made was known long before the time plaintiff claimed
the accident occurred. The day before this accident, a
similar change of buses was made at Payson. On the
day of the accident a change was made at Santaquin
and the reason for the change was that one of the buses
had broken down and was waiting for repairs at Red-
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mond, and on this very trip, before bus 392 ever reached
the scene of the accident, it had stopped at Redmond
and left repair parts for the broken down bus (R. 343348 and testimony of bus passengers).

In fact, both

Miss Anderson and 1\'liss Spencer stated that on this
trip they saw the broken down bus at Redmond (R. 231,
232, 245). These misstatements in the brief, in view of
the record, are nothing more nor less than presumption
and effrontery.
Again on page 8 of her brief appellant uses the word
''admit'' in describing testimony of the defendants. There
is no question here of admissions, as though we had been
forced into a corner to confess something that had to be
wrung out of us. Appellant states that we admit that
the bus was eight feet wide and that we admit that the
bus was the only bus that runs between Redmond and
Gunnison between six and seven o'clock in the evening.
In the first place, anyone could testify to the width of
the bus by measuring it or to the schedule of the Santa
Fe Transportation Company and the mere fact that
the o~cupants of the .Sorensen car used this knowledge
to fasten an impossible situation upon us cannot be construed as an admission on our part when we state facts
that everyone knows. In the second place, the Rio
Grande Trailways run over this same route and sometimes run in the evening off schedule (R. 381). As a
matter of fact, no bus, Rio Grande or Santa Fe, could
have caused the damage to the Sorensen left front
fender.
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Again on page 9 appellant says with reference to
Exhibits 3 and 4 that the witness "admitted" that the
pictures do not reflect the true condition of the Sorensen
car on November 15. Exactly the opposite is the fact.
The witness G. Vl. Sorensen, a mechanic, testified that
the only thing he did was to raise the fender probably
an inch and a half to get it off the wheel so he could
move the car, that the pictures (Exbil:bits 3 and 4) were
taken in the rear of his garage at Centerfield, Utah, and
that the exhibits correctly portray the body and fender
of the Chevrolet when he picked it up the night of November 15 after the accident (R. 393).
Another misstatement is also found on page 9 of
the brief. In commenting on the testimony of Highway
Patrolman Embly, appellant says that Embley went to
the Beck residence and ''had some discussion with Cleone
Jensen, which d[scussion his counsel did not permit him
to relate." We assume that by the statement ''his counsel" appellant means us, since we offered and were examining the witness. As a matter of fact, the record
shows that Mr. McCullough, appellant's counsel, objected to the witness answering the question as to what
Cleone Jensen said:
' ' EMBLEY: So I talked to Cleone Jensen at
that time. She seemed to be the one that was
Jeast injured, and she was the one tba t told me
what had happened.
MR. McCULLOUGH: Just a minute. We ob- ·
ject to this on the ground it is incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, hearsay.
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THE

CouRT:

I haven't heard any hearsay

yet.

Q. (By Mr. Strong): Were you going into
what Cleone told you- don't say what she told
you. Say what you observed from then on.''
On page 10 appellant's counsel say:
"Note that there is no evidence from witness
Embley that he ever examined bus No. 392, which
was the bus driven by Leonard Rushing on the
night of the accident.''
It is difficult to understand why counsel make .such misleading statements. Mr. Rushing testified that on November 18 on his trip north he was driving 392, and that
by pre-arrangement he met Patrolman Embly on the
Levan cut-off and that Patrolman Embly examined the
bus thoroughly (R. 357, 358, 359), and Patrolman Embley
testified that he examined every Santa Fe bus that came
through, not only 392, but every one of them, and that
on November 18 on the Levan cut-off he examined the
bus driven by Mr. Rushing (R. 405-409). He found no
evidence of any collision marks on any of the buses.
Counsel state on page 10 of their brief that Highway Patrolman Embley ''admitted" that there were tire
marks on the west shoulder of the road north Qf the
point of collision between the Anderson and Sorensen
cars as corroboration of the testimony of the occupants
of the Sorensen car that they had driven off the highway to avoid being struck by the bus. As a matter of
fact, Officer Embley testified that there were no marks
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on the highway indicating how the accident happened.
"I did not find any marks on the road that night from
the shoulder or any other place" (R. 410-411). With
reference to the west shoulder itself, he stated that
50 to 100 feet north of the point of collision between the
two cars he found tire marks on the west shoulder and
that they were made from cars that were stopping there
all the time, that if there had been any skid marks, they
would still have been present but there were none (R.
430-431). The tire marks on the west shoulder were all.
along there from the cars that had stopped there on
account of the collision between the Anderson and
Sorensen cars ( R. 410, 454).
On page 11 appellant's counsel say that Exhi•bit B
(Embley's notes) indicated that Cleone Jensen stated
;.

that on the night of the accident the Sorensen car and
the bus had collided, the impression being that on the
night of the accident Cleone Jensen had stated that the
bus collided with the Sorensen car. As a matter of fact,
Embley stated that he didn't get any of the statements
the night of the accident but got them on the next day
(R. 436), including Cleone Jensen's statement.
On page 12 appellant ooplies that the bus ride for
the passengers was one of turmoil and confusion by
saying:
''They all stated that it was a stormy night and
that the bus was crowded."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
As a matter of faet, all of the passengers said it was a
peaceful, uneventful, restful trip, and when counsel attempted to inject a blinding storm into it, one of the
witnesses said that one of the appealing things about the
trip was her observation in the snowstorm of the
pheasants along the roadway. The bus ride was a warm,
con1fortable, pleasant trip with nothing whatever occurring to disturb the equanimity of any of these lady
passengers.
On page 12 appellant tries to give the impression
that we bad spirited a witness, Mr. Whitlock, away from
the trial. :Mr. vVhitlock's testimony was at variance
with a statement he had previously given to us, in which
statement he stated that the truck was following the
bus. Then later he stated that the bus was following the
truck. In his statement and also in his evidence he
stated that the truck had no elearance lights on it, while
in his testimony in the Anderson case he stated that the
truck had clearance lights on it. .About the only thing he
remained firm about was that the truck almost hit his
car. We, nevertheless, subpoenaed him and intended to
use him and counsel knows, as the record clearly discloses, why he was excused. Mr. Whitlock stated at the
trial:

Q.

(R. 548):
Mr. Whitlock, Mr. McCullough asked you if
you had been subpoenaed by the defendant
and not used; that is right, isn't it 1

A.

That is right.

"BY MR.

JONES
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Q. Tuesday night you were excused, is that it?
A. I was.
Q. You told me you had to get back the next day,
didn't you?
A. I did. Yes.
Q. And you couldn't wait over Y
A. That is right.
Q. Without great financial loss to you, and so
I said, 'Well, you go ahead. '
A. That is correct.
Q. The plaintiff brought you back, and not me?
A. They did.''
The only mystery B.Jbout the matter is appellant's counsel's mention of the episode in their brief. It is akin to
the other mysteries in the story told by their witnesses.
It is significant, however, that Mr. Whitlock testified to
the presence of a truck without lights that nearly ran
into him. These details appellant fails to call to our
attention.

ARGUMENT
While appellant has specified 16 errors, she has dis·
eussed but 2 propositions :
"PROPOSJlTION I. THE TESTIMONY INTRODUCED
BY DEFENDANT'S OF ROSE SORENSEN'S FAILURE TO
HAVE A DRIVER'S LliCENiSE, AND COUNSEL FOR THE
DEFENDANT'S DIS,CUSSION OF SUtCH EVIDENCE BEFORE THE JUiiY ·CONSTITUTED' REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHICH DENIED TO THE DEFEND'ANT A FAIR AND IM·
PARTIAL TRIA!L.
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AAOPOSITION II. THE COURT ERREn IN LIMITING THE JURY TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR
NOT DEFENDANT'S BUS STRUCK THill AUTOMOBILE
DRIVEN BY ROSE SORENSEN, AND ERRED IN REFUSING
TO INSTRtUCT THE JURY THAT IF SAID BUS CHOW.DE'D
ROSE SORENSEN'S CAR OFF THE ROAD AND THEREBY
PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES THEN .SAID BUS OOMPANY WOULn BE LIABLE."

VvTe shall, therefore, discuss only the specifications of
error covered by the two propositions.

Several of the

specifications of error, such as 8, 9, 10, 12, and 14 on pages
14 and 15 of the brief, undoubtedly were abandoned by
appellant in view of the fact that the instructions requested are merely repetitious and were fully covered
by equally, if not more, exhaustive instructions given
by the court.
Coming ~ow to Proposition I. Appellant complains
that we introduced testimony that Rose Sorensen didn't
have a driver's license and of our comments to the jury
referring to her absence of a driver's license as one of
her reasons for desiring to direct attention from herself
to the defendant company and take the onus of an investigation from her own shoulders and place it on ours.
Appellant then cites several authorities to the effect that
failure to have a driver's license will not deprive a person of his right to recover for injuries inflicted on him
through negligence of another unless the absence of the .
license has a ·causal connection with the accident. We
find it somewhat difficult to understand why appellant
has cited these authorities, since we never contended
that Rose Sorensen's lack· of a driver's license would
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deprive the plaintiff of her cause of action, if any, against
us. That the ·court was of the same' opinion is abundantly
apparent in instrucion No. 8 to the jury wherein we
thought the court went a good deal farther than was
proper in elhninating anything pertaining to Rose
Sorensen from the consideration of the jury (this instruction will be referred to more extensively later). We
did not introduce testimony that Rose 8orensen had no
driver's license. We knew she didn't have one. We
asked her why she didn't have one, and appellant herself
produced this evidence later in page 2 of her Exhibit B
and her examination of the witness Embley with reference thereto (R. 439). This witness was the one from
whom we also received our information that Rose Sorensen had no driver's license. We in our cross examination were trying to find some basis for the weird story
told by Miss Sorensen. We knew that our bus had not
been !involved in any accident and had not sideswiped
or collided wti.th any car. At that point in the trial we
did not know that Miss Spencer and Miss Anderson were
going to state that the bus was anywhere in the vicinity
of the accident at the time it occurred, since they ,had led
Officer Embley to believe that they had not seen the
bus that day and that if it had been in front of them, they
would cerainly have seen it. Miss Sorensen had testified
that she and all the other occupants of her car were very.
nervous every time the bus passed them and we were
wondering if her nervousness was of such a nature as to
prevent her from getting a driver's license. Certainly
she had no right to be driving the car on that occasion
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without a driver's license and if her nervousness had
prevented her from getting a license, we were certainly
entitled to know that, espedally in view of the fact that
we know of no reason why she collided head-on with the
Anderson car. Our bus showed no evidence of any contact with her car, and certainly no collision with our bus
could have accounted for the damage to the left front
fender of her car or her fantastic statement that the bus
had glided gently into her but with sufficient force to
knock her dazed and that the terrific impact with the
Anderson car brought her to. If her nervousness and
her inability to secure a driver's license caused her to
go off the west side of the road and then careen over to
the east side, she and not ourselves were responsible for
the accident, and the fact that she had no driver's license
certainly required an inquiry and explanation of why
she didn't have one. We had contended all along that
we had nothing to do with the accident. Rose ,Sorensen
was the one who ran into the Anderson car and certainly
any evidence affecting her credibility or explaining
her reasons for trying to divert attention from herself
to somebody else was not only competent and material,
·but highly relevant, particularly in view of the fact that
neither she nor any of the occupants of her car had sued
us. We never contended that if the bus had actually hit
the Sorensen car the fact that Miss 8orentSen had no
· driver's license would deprive the plaintiff of her right
of action against us and the court plainly and emphatically told the jury that plaintiff could not be held responsible for anything Rose Sorensen did if our bus had bit
1
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her car. If Rose Sorensen's nervousness was the cause
of her erratic driving so that she could not secure a
driver's license, that would explain how she happened to
go off the road on the west side and then cross over to
the east side and hit the Anderson car. Certainly it
ta~es credulity to believe that our heavy bus could have
hit her and the blow of the bus deflect her course to the
east in the same direction from which the alleged force
came, instead of to the west and down into the barrow
pit <immediately adjacent to the west shoulder as lawsof physics would seem to require. We were then and
are now entirely in the dark as to why Rose Sorensen
collided with the Anderson car and were enti tied to discover if we could any reason for her actions that night.
It will be noted that both our question on crossexamination and our reference to the driver's license in
argument to the jury are directed solely to the credibility of the witness in her efforts to divert attention
from herself to us, the innocent bystander, as the cause
of the accident.
In stating their Proposition I, appellant's counsel
''The t~stimony introduced by defendants of Rose
Sorensen's failure to have a driver's license," etc. We
did not introduce any evidence that she didn't have a
driver's license. That was done by appellant's own
counsel by means of their Exhibit B. All we did was
ask Miss Sorensen why she didn't have one. Appellant
was under no compulsion or necessity to offer Exhibit
B in evidence. Her counsel knew it was incompetent
~ay,
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and hearsay, but notwithstanding that, he 1nade a play
of it before the jury, waving it around in front of the
jury and the witness, and probably no one was rnore
surprised than appellant's counsel himself at our consent to the reception in evidence of his Exhibit B. Appellant's counsel asked the witness Embley if he had
made any rnenwrandum. Upon receiving an affirmative
answer, he asked for the n1emorandum and then asked
the indulgence of the court while he proceeded to read
it to himself in the presence of the court and jury. He
then asked to have it marked and said (R. 432, 433):
"Now, turning to the second page of what has
been marked for identification as Exhibit 'B ', is
there anv memoranda there with reference to what
Maxine Anderson said to you~''
(It will be noted that on the second page also appears
under the heading Rose .Sorensen, the following: ''No
operator's license''). Of course we objected to this
method of pro·cedure and insisted that we should have a
right to lo·ok at the exhibit and that if he was going to
examine with reference to these notes, they should be
offered in evidence before such an examination took
place. Counsel persisted in his efforts and we insisted
on seeing the notes. Counsel protested that he didn't
want ''to disclose my hand to the attorneys on the other
side." Mr. Embley stated that the information contained
in the notes w.as received from the persons questioned
the day after the accident and that he did not get the
information from them the night of the accident. This
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colloquy covers five or six pages of the record (R. 432437). The following appears on page 437 :
''MR. McCuLLOUGH : As part of the cross
examination of this witness, we would like to
offer in evidence the Exhibit B, including all of
the statements which he has here with reference
not only to Maxine Anderson, but each and every
one of the witnesses, as to what they told him,
as far .as the accident is concerned.
MR. JONEs: Mr. McCullough knows it is absolutely irncompetent. * * * but I haven't any
objection to its going in.
THE COURT: I thought you were going to
object to it.
1

I

MR. JoNES: It is objectionable, and he knows
it is, but I am going to let the jury see it. He has
made this play before them; let them see it.
MR.

~IcCuLLOUGH :

No play at all.

THE CouRT: Let's go ahead. No objection?
MR. JONEs: It is all right.
THE CouRT: It. may be received."
Thus appellant's counsel himself offered the evidence
that Rose Sorensen had no operator's license. All we
did was question her as to why she didn't have one.
Not satisfied with having put the exhibit in evidence, counsel then proceeded to go over the memorandum
item by item (R. 439) :
And the next page, you got 'Rose Sorensen'?
A. The driver.

'' Q.
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.
· Q.
A.
Q.
A.

'Rednwnd, Utah'. That is her address~
Yes.
'Age 49 '. Is that correct~
Yes.
'One year driving.' Correct~
Yes sir, one year driving experience, that is.
And then it shows 'No operator's license'.
That is right.''

It is thus somewhat ludicrous for counsel to ohject to
our asking Rose 8orensen why she didn't have a li·cense
when he is the one who later insisted on presenting to
the jury the positive evidence that she didn't have the
license.
Even if we were to assume that the cross examination is erroneous in the first instance, which it was not,
any complaint appellant may have had was certainly
waived by the voluntary conduct of her own counsel in
offering the only positive evidence there is of the nonexistence of her driver's license. In this state, as in
most jurisdictions, we have definite statutory enactments
that would preclude appellant taking advantage of any
such situation even had our cross examination been improper, which it was not. Section 104-14-7, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, provides :
''The court must in every stage of an action
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or
proceedings which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties, and no judgment shall be
reversed or affected by reason of such error or
defect.''
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Also, Section 104-39-3, as follows:
''No exception shall be regarded, unless the
decision excepted to is material and prejudicial
to the swbstantial rights of the party excepting.''
Certainly ~n the face of counsel's own conduct, nothing
that we did was prejudicial or effected the substantial
rights of the plaintiff. The jury would have known of
Rose Sorensen's lack of a driver's li·cense if we bad
never said a word. Counsel was, to use an expressive
colloquialism, "hell bent" on getting Exhibit B in evidence or els·e malcing the jury believe it contained something we were afraid of, even though he knew it was
~ncompetent. Counsel is thus hoist with his own petard.
As this court said in B. T. Moran, Inc., v. First
Security Corporation, 82 Utah 316, 24 P. (2d) 384, at
page 327 of the U tab Reports :
"With the copy of the telegram eliminated there
was sufficient evidence to support a finding that
notice of withdrawal of the offer was communicated to the agent before acceptance of the contract by the principal at Chicago."
In that case evidence claimed to be incompetent was' received over objection, but later the same information
was put in without objection and thus no prejudice occurred. Paraphrasing the language of this court in that
case, we could say:
"With the cross examination of Rose Sorensen
eliminated there was sufficient evidence to support
a finding that she had no driver's license."
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Also in the case of Schofield v. Zion's Co-op. Mercantile lnstit,ution, 85 Utah 281, 39 P. (2d) 342, where
con1plaint was made of the introduction of certain letters but the infonnation contained in the letters was
subsequently otherwise received in evidence, this court
at page 294 of the Utah Report says:
'' Furthernwre no dispute is made in the record
as to the facts recited in the letters, so they could
in no wise be prejudicial.''
In the case of V a;n Leewwen v. Huffaker, 78 Utah
521, 5 P. (2d) 714, secondary evidence as to the contents
of a written instrument was received without the proper
foundation being laid for its reception. Objection was
made, which was overruled. This court held that it was
error to overrule the objection but that the error was
rendered harmless by what transpired afterwards during the trial. The same evidence as was contained in
the secondary evidence was offered and received orally
and this court on page 534 of the Utah Reports says:
''It thus appears that defendant himself in
his own testimony admitted substantially all that
plaintiff sought to prove by the contract * * *.
Such being the state of the record, we do not see
how the error of the trial court could have resulted in any prejudice to the substantial rights of
the defendant.'' (Citing Com. Laws Utah 1917,
Sec. 6622, which is the same as our present 10414-7).
See also 3 Am. Jur., p. 583.
Still bearing in mind then that the failure of Ros·e
Sorensen to have a driver's license was never advanced
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as an argument to deprive plaintiff of her cause of
action if our bus had actually run into Rose .Sorensen's
car, let us advert briefly to appellant's ohjection to the
refusal of the court to instruct the jury that failure to
have a driver's license was immaterial. Counsel requested the court to single out this one bit of evidence
and emphasize it by giving instructions directed to that
point alone. That it is bad practice to sti.ngle out one
p'articular piece of evidence and emphasize it in instructions has been held so often as to require no citation of
authority. In addition to that, no one ever claimed that
the manner in which Rose Sorensen operated her automo·bile could defeat plaintiff's right of recovery if our bus
had run into Rose .Sorensen's car. Rose .Sorensen's negligence or contributory negligence was not an issue in the
case, even though appellant's counsel against her interest
tried to make it an issue. Counsel attempted to make it
an issue by his request for instructions 9 and 11. The
·court, however, in instruction No. 8 not only in effect
instructed the jury that Rose Sorensen's conduct in this
respect was immaterial, but stated specifically that if
the bus struck the Sorensen car causing it to beoome
uncontrollable and unmanagea:ble, plaintiff was entitled
to recover regardless of anything ,Rose >Sorensen did.
The instruction is in full as follows :
''Instruction No. 8
You are ~nstructed that even though you believe that Ros.e Sorensen may not have been
operating her automobile in a careful and prudent
~anner at the time it was allegedly struck by
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the def0ndant eon1pany 's bus, nevertheless if
you do ~believe, by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant company's bus was, at
the time and place in question, being operated in
a negligent manner, as set forth in these instructions, and as a direct result of such negligence,
if any, struck the Rose Sorensen car, causing the
smne to become uncontrollable and unmanageable,
and for that reason causing a collision with the
Anderson car, as a result of which plaintiff was
injured, then you will find for the plaintiff, regardless of whether or not Rose Sorensen was driving
her automobile in a proper or an improper manner.''
Appellant's counsel have failed to comment upon or
call this instruction to this court's attention.

This is

hardly consistent with frankness or with dealing fairly
with the trial court. If the jury believed our bus hit
the Sorensen car, this instruction eliminated from consideration by the jury our cross examination with reference to the driver's license, our mention of it to the
jury in our argument, and appellant's own evidence that
Miss Sorensen didn't have a license. It also corrected
any prior error, (we claim there was none) that may have
occurred, ·by withdrawing the whole matter of Rose
Sorensen's conduct from the consideration of the jury.
It thus more emphatically appears that no prejudice
resulted to the plaintiff, nor were her substantial rights
affected. As this court has said on many occasions, "If
any errors were committed in this respect, the same were
cured by the court's instruction to the jury, and therefore no useful purpose can be served by a discussion of
these assignments in this opinion." Campbell v. Los
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Angeles & 8. L. R. Co., 71 Utah 173, 263 P. 495, page 180
of the Utah Reports; Ludlow v·. Los Angeles & 8. L. R.
Co., 73 Utah 513, 275 P. 592, page 519 of the Utah Reports. In Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages, 142 P. (2d)
674, at page 677, this court as late as October 27, 1943,
said:
I

''The instructions given are not models and could
have been improved upon. However, they substantially cover the material requested, and therefore it was not prejudicial error to refuse
plaintiffs' request, since the substance thereof was
giv,en in other instructions.''
It also will be noted that ·counsel for appellant made
no objection to our argument to the jury, no request to
the court to instruct the jury with reference to it, and
thus is in no po!sition in this court to complain of the
matter even if he could have done so at the time of trial.
This proposition is well settled.
"It is assumed that proper objection 'was made;
if it was not, the error is not reversible." 3 Am.
Jur., pp. 609-610, Sec. 1062.
Appellant's second proposition is ridiculous.
On page 22 of their brief counsel query, "Can defendants complain if the evidence fails to show all that
plaintiffs allege and sliows merely an actionable part of
it f '' Plaintiff's pleadings do not allege nor does her
evidence show any actionable negligence on the part of
the defendants if the bus did not strike the Sorensen car.
Counsel say that the plaintiff should not be precluded
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from recovery simply because the jury finds that the
bus only crowded the Sorensen car off the road and did
not actually strike it. There is not one word of evidence
or one inference in the record that the bus simply
crowded the Sorensen car off the road without striking
it. If the jury were at liberty to make such a finding,
they could only do so by some speculation of their own
and by disbelieving the testimony of every occupant in
the Sorensen car, in which case plaintiff would have no
evidence whatever to go to the jury.
The fact of the matter is, however, that there is no
question of ''variance" involved in this case. There is
no variance beween plaintiff's pleading and her proof.
Counsel themselves apparently overlook the fact that
they concede the same thing. On pages 1 and 2 of their
brief they say:
"The plaintiff's and the defendants' evidence
differed as to how the accident occurred. The
difference consisted in plaintiff's evidence which
showed that the ·bus, while travelling north on the
aforesaid highway at the time and place alleged,
sideswiped an automobile driven by Rose Sorensen, which was traveling in the opposite direction, causing said automobile to careen out of
control onto the side of the road on which the
automobile, in which plaintiff was riding as a
passenger, was traveling. As a result, the Sorensen car crashed into the car in which plaintiff was
riding and plaintiff sustained the serious and
permanent injuries complained of. The defendants' version of the accident differs principally
in the fact that they deny that the bus struck the
Sorensen car.''
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Plaintiff's whole complaint is founded upon the theory
that our bus hit the Sorensen car' and that the impact
was the sole cause of the collision between the Sorensen
and Anderson cars and the resulting injuries. Paragraph 4 of their complaint states, ''striking the front
left portion of an automobile driven by Rose Sorensen,
traveling in a southerly direction on said highway, with
the left rear portion of the defendant company's bus,
knocking said automobile out of control so that the same
ran into and against the front portion of the automobile
in which plaintiff was riding.''
The specific acts of negilgence charged against us,
aside from one that we were traveling in excess of 5(J
miles an hour which was not presented to the jury because of a total lack of evidence, are all based exclusively
on the fact that we ran into the 8orensen car. A8 we
have already pointed out in the resume of the testimony,
every one of plaintiff's witnesses who attempted to ac.
count for the accident stated that it was the impact of
the bus that started the trouble. In fact, Cleone Jensen
stated that was the only thing she was sure of. According to them, the impact knocked them dazed, knocked the
left front fender down onto the wheel, knocked the
Chevrolet out of control. The whole issue was whether
or not the bus hit the Chevrolet. Our entire testimony
was directed to meeting this issue. At no time did we
have any intimation that we were called upon to defend
ourselves against a claim that our bus merely crowded
the Sorensen car off the road. The fact of the matter
is that the argument of variance is a pure afterthought,
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concocted out of thin air and not even built upon shifting sands. It doesn't have any foundation upon which
to rest, and to attempt to insert it into this case is absurd.
A consideration of the entire record in this case convinces one that it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for an unbiased jury to arrive at any other result
than the one reached herein, and that plaintiff had a
full and fair trial and that the correct verdict was
rendered. The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RicH, RicH & STRONG, and
SHIRLEY P. JoNEs,

Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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